| | |
|---|---|
| **From:** | Dworkin, Morris J. (Fed) |
| **To:** | Cooper, David (Fed); Dang, Quynh H. (Fed); Davidson, Michael S. (Fed); Miller, Carl A. (Fed); (b) (6) [redacted] |
| **Subject:** | FW: Draft summary for PQC team |
| **Date:** | Thursday, June 4, 2020 3:09:33 PM |
| **Attachments:** | llc-NIST SP on stateful HBS 20200501.docx |

I used the Sharepoint interface to send Lily's comments (below, and in the attachedfile ) yesterday, forgetting that you might not see it that way.

So let's not meet tomorrow, but plan to check in Tuesday at 1:00. I sent a calendar invitation.

Morrie

---

**From:** "Dworkin, Morris J. (Fed)" <morris.dworkin@nist.gov>
**Date:** Wednesday, June 3, 2020 at 10:04 AM
**To:** Stateful Hash-Based Signatures <StatefulHash-BasedSignatures@nistgov.onmicrosoft.com>
**Subject:** FW: Draft summary for PQC team

Good morning,

FYI, here are Lily's comments. John has told me that he's still working on his.

Since there's no full team meeting, I'm thinking we can check in with a teleconference at 10 on Friday?

Morrie

---

**From:** "Chen, Lily (Fed)" <lily.chen@nist.gov>
**Date:** Tuesday, June 2, 2020 at 4:07 PM
**To:** "Dworkin, Morris J. (Fed)" <morris.dworkin@nist.gov>
**Subject:** Re: Draft summary for PQC team

Hi, Morrie,

The document is well written. I agree with the resolutions the WG proposed on the public comments. I have a few very minor editorial comments as attached. It is not an easy task to have a Recommendation based on IETF RFCs w.r.t. what should be included in this Recommendation. Most of my comments are on whether to refer or to give a short explanation in this document. If you have question, please let me know.

Thanks,
Lily

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**From:** Morris Dworkin <morris.dworkin@nist.gov>
**Date:** Monday, May 4, 2020 at 9:14 AM
**To:** internal-pqc <internal-pqc@nist.gov>
**Subject:** FW: Draft summary for PQC team

On behalf of the internal working group for stateful hash-based signatures, I am attaching for your review 1) our proposed responses to the public comments that we received on Draft SP 800-208, and 2) the revision of the draft SP, both a Word file with the changes tracked and a clean PDF file. If you have any comments on the documents, please send them to me by Friday, May 15, or let me know if you would like extra time.

Below is a summary of the main issues we considered.

Regards,

Morrie

Technical:

1. Many commenters objected to the prohibition against the exporting of private keys from the module. The WG strongly recommends that the prohibition be maintained. The revised SP clarifies that even encrypted keys may not be exported—see Thales's Comment 10.
2. ETSI's comments included a multi-target attack on XMSS key generation--see Page 19 of public comment document, referring to Line 576 of the draft SP. The revised draft mandates a new key generation function to address the attack. David notified the XMSS designers of the proposal, and they did not object.
3. Kampanakis (Cisco) and Google requested Level 1 parameter sets, i.e., with 128-bit hash values. The WG recommends against this change but did not reach a consensus on the formal response to the comments. In particular, it is difficult to justify why the draft SP went beyond the RFCs in specifying Level 3 parameter sets, i.e., 192-bit hash values, but not all the way to Level 1. Feedback from the full PQC team would be helpful.
4. The draft SP "Notes to Reviewers" asked whether a method should be specified for distributing a single Merkle tree across multiple modules, without violating the prohibition on key export, in order to shorten signatures compared to multi-tree implementations. Since no commenters requested the method, the WG decided not to provide it.
5. The Notes to Reviewers also asked about the appropriateness of the specified parameter sets. No commenter advocated for removal of any specific parameter sets, and the Level 1 parameter sets—discussed in 4)

above—were the only new sets specifically requested. A couple of commenters requested  that the parameter sets for HSS and XMSS^MT be harmonized, but no specific proposals were provided, and the WG didn't agree that the harmonization would be very beneficial.

6. The WG did not agree with Huelsing's suggestion to provide a method for forward-secure key generation.
7. The WG did not agree with NSA's suggestion to provide parameter sets with SHA-384 and SHA 512, nor Thales's suggestion (Comment 7) to allow a block cipher-based replacement for the hash function.
8. The revised SP clarifies that a "one-time" signature may not be re-generated on the same message; the WG decided that an entire subsection on fault injection attacks was therefore unnecessary.
9. The revised SP requires that the entropy source for any random bit generation be located inside the physical boundary of the module.

Editorial

10. Subsection 2.3 (Mathematical Symbols) was expanded to include the variables from the schemes that were discussed elsewhere  in the SP.
11. An underlying assumption in the description of the security proof for XMSS was corrected.
12. In response to Yi-Kai's comments before the release of the draft SP, a brief discussion of the difficulty of key revocation is provided in Subsection 9.3.
13. The WG did not agree with Thales's suggestion (Comment 4) to provide a comparison of performance data as guidance for selecting one of the two schemes.

# Draft NIST Special Publication 800-208

# Recommendation for Stateful Hash-Based Signature Schemes

David A. Cooper
Daniel C. Apon
Quynh H. Dang
Michael S. Davidson
Morris J. Dworkin
Carl A. Miller

This publication is available free of charge from:
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-208-draft

C O M P U T E R   S E C U R I T Y

National Institute of Standards and Technology
U.S. Department of Commerce

# Draft NIST Special Publication 800-208

# Recommendation for Stateful Hash-Based Signature Schemes

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*Computer Security Division*
*Information Technology Laboratory*

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December 2019

U.S. Department of Commerce
*Wilbur L. Ross, Jr., Secretary*

National Institute of Standards and Technology
*Walter Copan, NIST Director and Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology*

## Authority



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Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. Spec. Publ. 800-208, 54 pages (December 2019)
CODEN: NSPUE2

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**Public comment period: *December 11, 2019* through *February 28, 2020***

**Commented [DC1]:** This and other parts of the front matter will be modified as appropriate, depending on whether the next version to be posted is the final version or another draft.

National Institute of Standards and Technology
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100 Bureau Drive (Mail Stop 8930) Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930
Email: pqc-comments@nist.gov

All comments are subject to release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

## Reports on Computer Systems Technology

The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the Nation's measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the development and productive use of information technology. ITL's responsibilities include the development of management, administrative, technical, and physical standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of other than national security-related information in federal information systems. The Special Publication 800-series reports on ITL's research, guidelines, and outreach efforts in information system security, and its collaborative activities with industry, government, and academic organizations.


## Abstract

This recommendation specifies two algorithms that can be used to generate a digital signature, both of which are stateful hash-based signature schemes: the Leighton-Micali Signature (LMS) system and the eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS), along with their multi-tree variants, the Hierarchical Signature System (HSS) and multi-tree XMSS ($XMSS^{MT}$).



## Keywords

cryptography; digital signatures; hash-based signatures; public-key cryptography.

## Document Conventions

The terms "**shall**" and "**shall not**" indicate requirements to be followed strictly in order to conform to the publication and from which no deviation is permitted.

The terms "should" and "should not" indicate that among several possibilities one is recommended as particularly suitable, without mentioning or excluding others, or that a certain course of action is preferred but not necessarily required, or that (in the negative form) a certain possibility or course of action is discouraged but not prohibited.

The terms "may" and "need not" indicate a course of action permissible within the limits of the publication.

The terms "can" and "cannot" indicate a possibility and capability, whether material, physical or causal.

## Conformance Testing

Conformance testing for implementations of the functions that are specified in this publication will be conducted within the framework of the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP). The requirements on these implementations are indicated by the word "**shall**." Some of these requirements may be out-of-scope for CAVP or CMVP validation testing, and thus are the responsibility of entities using, implementing, installing, or configuring applications that incorporate this Recommendation.

## ~~Note to Reviewers~~

~~Sections 4 and 5 specify the parameter sets that are approved by this recommendation for LMS, HSS, XMSS, and~~ ~~$XMSS^{MT}$~~~~. Given the large number of parameter sets specified in these two sections, NIST would like feedback on whether there would be a benefit in reducing the number of parameter sets that are approved, and if so, which ones should be removed.~~

~~While this recommendation does not allow cryptographic modules to export private keying material, Section 7 describes a way in which a single key pair can be created with the one-time keys being spread across multiple cryptographic modules. The method described in Section 7 involves creating a 2-level HSS or~~ ~~$XMSS^{MT}$~~ ~~tree where the one-time keys associated with each of the bottom-level trees can be created on a different cryptographic module.~~

~~NIST believes that it would be possible to create a one-level XMSS or LMS tree in which the one-time keys are not all created and stored on the same cryptographic module. Key generation would be more complicated to implement, though, as would be the steps that end users would have to perform during the key generation process. However, a one-level tree would result in shorter signatures.~~

~~NIST would like feedback on whether there is a need to be able to create one-level XMSS or LMS keys in which the one-time keys are not all created and stored on the same cryptographic module even though such an option would be more complicated to implement and use than the two-level option that is already described in the draft.~~

## Call for Patent Claims

This public review includes a call for information on essential patent claims (claims whose use would be required for compliance with the guidance or requirements in this Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) draft publication). Such guidance and/or requirements may be directly stated in this ITL Publication or by reference to another publication. This call also includes disclosure, where known, of the existence of pending U.S. or foreign patent applications relating to this ITL draft publication and of any relevant unexpired U.S. or foreign patents.

ITL may require from the patent holder, or a party authorized to make assurances on its behalf, in written or electronic form, either:

a) assurance in the form of a general disclaimer to the effect that such party does not hold and does not currently intend holding any essential patent claim(s); or

b) assurance that a license to such essential patent claim(s) will be made available to applicants desiring to utilize the license for the purpose of complying with the guidance or requirements in this ITL draft publication either:

    i) under reasonable terms and conditions that are demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination; or

    ii) without compensation and under reasonable terms and conditions that are demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination.

Such assurance shall indicate that the patent holder (or third party authorized to make assurances on its behalf) will include in any documents transferring ownership of patents subject to the assurance, provisions sufficient to ensure that the commitments in the assurance are binding on the transferee, and that the transferee will similarly include appropriate provisions in the event of future transfers with the goal of binding each successor-in-interest.

The assurance shall also indicate that it is intended to be binding on successors-in-interest regardless of whether such provisions are included in the relevant transfer documents.

Such statements should be addressed to: pqc-comments@nist.gov

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# 1 Introduction

This publication supplements FIPS 186-4 [4] by specifying two additional digital signature schemes, both of which are stateful hash-based signature (HBS) schemes: the Leighton-Micali Signature (LMS) system [2] and the eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS) [1], along with their multi-tree variants, the Hierarchical Signature System (HSS) and multi-tree XMSS (XMSS$^{MT}$). All of the digital signature schemes specified in FIPS 186-4 will be broken if large-scale quantum computers are ever built. The security of the stateful HBS schemes in this publication, however, only depends on the security of the underlying hash functions—in particular, the infeasibility of finding a preimage or a second preimage—and it is believed that the security of hash functions will not be broken by the development of large-scale quantum computers [20].

This recommendation specifies profiles of LMS, HSS, XMSS, and XMSS$^{MT}$ that are appropriate for use by the U.S. Federal Government. This profile approves the use of some but not all of the parameter sets defined in [1] and [2] and also defines some new parameter sets. The approved parameter sets use 192- or 256-bit outputs with either SHA-256 [3] or SHAKE256 [5] ~~with 192- or 256-bit outputs~~. It requires that key and signature generation be performed in hardware cryptographic modules that do not allow secret keying material to be exported, even in encrypted form.

## 1.1 Intended Applications for Stateful HBS Schemes

NIST is in the process of developing standards for post-quantum secure digital signature schemes [7] that can be used as replacements for the schemes that are specified in [4]. Stateful HBS schemes are not suitable for general use because they require careful state management that is often difficult to assure, as summarized in Section 1.2 and described in detail in [8].

Instead, stateful HBS schemes are primarily intended for applications with the following characteristics: 1) it is necessary to implement a digital signature scheme in the near future; 2) the implementation will have a long lifetime; and 3) it would not be practical to transition to a different digital signature scheme once the implementation has been deployed.

An application that may fit this profile is authenticating firmware updates for constrained devices. Some constrained devices that will be deployed in the near future will be in use for decades. These devices will need to have a secure mechanism for receiving firmware updates, and it may not be practical to change the code for verifying signatures on updates once the devices have been deployed.

## 1.2 The Importance of the Proper Maintenance of State

In a stateful HBS scheme, an HBS private key ~~pair~~ consists of a large set of one-time signature (OTS) private key~~ pair~~s. ~~An HBS key pair may contain thousands, millions, or billions of OTS keys, and the~~ The signer needs to ensure that no individual OTS key is ever used to sign more than one message. If an attacker were able to obtain digital signatures for two different messages created using the same OTS key, then it would become computationally feasible for that attacker to forge signatures on arbitrary messages [13]. Therefore, as described in [8], when a stateful HBS scheme is implemented, extreme care needs to be taken in order to ensure that no OTS key is ever reused.

In order to obtain assurance that OTS keys are not reused, the signing process should be performed in a highly controlled environment. As described in [8], there are many ways in which seemingly routine operations could lead to the risk of one-time key reuse. The conformance requirements imposed in Section 8.1 on cryptographic modules that implement stateful HBS schemes are intended to help prevent one-time key reuse.

### 1.3 Outline of Text

The remainder of this document is divided into the following sections and appendices:

- Section 2, *Glossary of Terms, Acronyms, and Mathematical Symbols*, defines the terms, acronyms, and mathematical symbols used in this document. This section is *informative*.
- Section 3, *General Discussion*, gives a conceptual explanation of the elements used in stateful hash-based signature schemes (including hash chains, Merkle trees, and hash prefixes). This section may be used as either a high-level overview of stateful hash-based signature schemes or as an introduction to the detailed descriptions of LMS and XMSS provided in [1] and [2]. This section is *informative*.
- Section 4, *Leighton-Micali Signatures (LMS) Parameter Sets*, describes the parameter sets that are approved for use by this Special Publication with LMS and HSS.
- Section 5, *eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS) Parameter Sets*, describes the parameter sets that are approved for use by this Special Publication with XMSS and $XMSS^{MT}$.
- Section 6, *Random Number Generation for Keys and Signatures*, states how the random data used in XMSS and LMS must be generated.
- Section 7, *Distributed Multi-Tree Hash-Based Signatures*, provides recommendations for distributing the implementation of a single HSS or $XMSS^{MT}$ instance over multiple cryptographic modules.
- Section 8, *Conformance*, specifies requirements for cryptographic algorithm and module validation that are specific to modules that implement the algorithms in this document.
- Section 9, *Security Considerations*, enumerates security risks in various scenarios for stateful HBS schemes (with a focus on the problem of key reuse) and describes steps that should be taken to maximize the security of an implementation. This section is *informative*.
- Appendix A, *LMS XDR Syntax Additions*, describes additions that are required for the External Data Representation (XDR) syntax for LMS in order to support the new parameter sets specified in this document.
- Appendix B, *XMSS XDR Syntax Additions*, describes additions that are required for the XDR syntax for XMSS and $XMSS^{MT}$ in order to support the new parameter sets specified in this document.

- Appendix C, *Provable Security Analysis*, provides information about the security proofs that are available for LMS and XMSS. This section is *informative*.

# 2 Glossary of Terms, Acronyms, and Mathematical Symbols

## 2.1 Terms and Definitions

| | |
|---|---|
| **approved** | FIPS-**approved** or NIST-recommended. An algorithm or technique that is either 1) specified in a FIPS or NIST Recommendation, or 2) adopted in a FIPS or NIST Recommendation and specified either (a) in an appendix to the FIPS or NIST Recommendation, or (b) in a document referenced by the FIPS or NIST Recommendation. |

## 2.2 Acronyms

Selected acronyms and abbreviations used in this publication are defined below.

| | |
|---|---|
| EEPROM | Electronically erasable programmable read-only memory |
| EUF-CMA | Existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen message attacks |
| FIPS | Federal Information Processing Standard |
| HBS | Hash-based signature |
| HSS | Hierarchical Signature Scheme |
| IRTF | Internet Research Task Force |
| LM-OTS | Leighton-Micali One-Time Signature |
| LMS | Leighton-Micali signature |
| NIST | National Institute of Standards and Technology |
| OTS | One-time signature |
| QROM | Quantum random oracle model |
| RAM | Random access memory |
| RFC | Request for Comments |
| ROM | Random oracle model |
| SHA | Secure Hash Algorithm |
| SHAKE | Secure Hash Algorithm KECCAK |
| SP | Special publication |

| | |
|---|---|
| VM | Virtual machine |
| WOTS+ | Winternitz One-Time Signature Plus |
| XDR | External Data Representation |
| XMSS | eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme |
| $XMSS^{MT}$ | Multi-tree XMSS |

## 2.3 Mathematical Symbols

| | |
|---|---|
| SHA-256(*M*) | SHA-256 hash function as specified in [3] |
| SHA-256/192(*M*) | $T_{192}$(SHA-256(*M*)), the most significant (i.e., leftmost) 192 bits of the SHA-256 hash of *M* |
| SHAKE256/256(*M*) | SHAKE256(*M*, 256), where SHAKE256 is specified in Section 6.2 of [5] |
| SHAKE256/192(*M*) | SHAKE256(*M*, 192), where SHAKE256 is specified in Section 6.2 of [5] |
| $T_{192}(X)$ | A truncation function that outputs the most significant (i.e., leftmost) 192 bits of the input bit string *X*. |
| *n* | The number of bytes in the output of a hash function. |
| *m* | In LMS, the number of bytes associated with each node of a Merkle tree. |
| *w* | 1. In XMSS, the length of a Winternitz chain. A single Winternitz chain uses $\log_2(w)$ bits from the hash or checksum.<br>2. In LMS, the number of bits from the hash or checksum used in a single Winternitz chain. The length of a Winternitz chain is $2^w$. (Note that using a Winternitz parameter of $w = 4$ in LMS would be comparable to using a parameter of $w = 16$ in XMSS.) |
| *p* | The number of *n*-byte string elements in an LM-OTS private key, public key, and signature. |
| *len* | The number of *n*-byte string elements in a WOTS+ private key, public key, and signature. |
| *h* | In LMS and XMSS, the height of the tree. In $XMSS^{MT}$, the total height of the multi-tree (the trees at each level have a height of $h / d$). |

**Commented [LLC2]:** These two definitions are correct. But for most readers, they may not need all the details about the definition of SHAKE256. However, if it can be mentioned that 192 and 256 are output length, it will be helpful.

| | |
|---|---|
| *d* | The number of levels of trees in $XMSS^{MT}$. |
| *L* | The number of levels of trees in HSS. |
| *I* | A 16-byte string used in LMS as a key pair identifier. |
| *C* | In LMS, the *n*-byte randomizer used for randomized message hashing. |
| *r* | In XMSS, the *n*-byte randomizer used for randomized message hashing. |
| *SK_PRF* | An *n*-byte key used to pseudorandomly generate the randomizer *r*. |
| *S_XMSS* | A secret random value used for pseudorandom key generation in XMSS. |
| *ADRS* | A 32-byte data structure used in XMSS when generating prefixes (keys) and bitmasks. |
| *SEED* | 1. In XMSS, the public, random, unique identifier for the long-term key.<br>2. In LMS, a secret random value used for pseudorandom key generation. |

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# 3 General Discussion

At a high level, XMSS and LMS are very similar. They each consist of two components—a one-time signature (OTS) scheme and a method for creating a single, long-term public key from a large set of OTS public keys. A brief explanation of OTS schemes and the method for creating a long-term public key from a large set of OTS public keys can be found in Sections 3 and 4 of [14].

**Commented [LLC3]:** Again, nothing is wrong here. This is in the beginning of the document. For the readers, who has no idea about hash based signatures, maybe a term added in the middle of the sentence will help them a lot. Most people will not check all the references as they read a document, if they do not really need to implement it. Here is my suggestion "A brief explanation of OTS schemes and the method for creating a long-term public key from a large set of OTS public keys through a tree structure can be found in Sections 3 and 4 of [14]."

I also noticed that hash tree is explained in 3.2 of this document.

## 3.1 One-Time Signature Systems

Both LMS and XMSS make use of variants of the Winternitz signature scheme. In the Winternitz signature scheme, the message to be signed is hashed to create a digest; the digest is encoded as a base *b* number;[1] and then each digit of the digest is signed using a hash chain, as follows.

A hash chain is created by first randomly generating a secret value, *x*, which is the private key. The size of *x* should generally correspond to the targeted strength of the scheme. So for the parameter sets approved by this recommendation, *x* will be either 192 or 256 bits in length. The public key, *pub*, is then created by applying the hash function, *H*, to the secret *b* – 1 times, $H^{b-1}(x)$. Figure 1 shows an example of a hash chain for the *k*th digit of a digest where *b* is 4.




**Figure 1: A sample Winternitz chain for *b* = 4**

The *k*th digit of the digest, $N_k$, is signed by applying the hash function, *H*, to the private key $N_k$ times, $H^{N_k}(x_k)$. ~~In~~ Figure 2 shows an example of a signature for the *k*th digit of the digest created using the Winternitz chain in Figure 1 when ~~Figure 1,~~ $N_k$ is 1. ~~, and so~~ As shown, the signature is $s_k = H^1(x_k) = H(x_k)$. Figure 2 also shows how the signature, $s_k$, can be verified. ~~The signature can be verified by checking that $pub_k = H^{b-1-N_k}(s_k)$. So in Figure 1,~~ The hash




function, *H*, is applied to the signature, $s_k$, twice, and if the resulting value is the same as the public key, $pub_k$, then the signature is valid. In general, t~~T~~he signature for the *k*th digit of a digest can be verified by checking that $pub_k = H^{b-1-N_k}(s_k)$. ~~the signature can be verified by checking that $pub_k = H^{4-1-1}(s_k) = H^2(s_k) = H(H(s_k))$.~~

[1] The base *b* is referred to as the Winternitz parameter in this publication. RFC 8391 [1] specifies that the Winternitz parameter—denoted by *w* there—may be either 4 or 16, but only specifies parameter sets for *w* = 16. In RFC 8554 [2], the term "Winternitz parameter"—also denoted by *w*—refers to a different but related quantity: the number of bits of the digest that is encoded by *b*. RFC 8554 specifies that *w* may be 1, 2, 4, or 8, which corresponds to a *b* of 2, 4, 16, or 256, respectively.




Figure 2: A sample Winternitz signature generation and verification

As noted in [14], simply signing the individual digits of the digest is not sufficient as an attacker would be able to generate valid signatures for other message digests. For example, given $s_k = H(x_k)$, as in Figure 1, an attacker would be able to generate a signature for a message digest with a $k$th digit of 2 by applying $H$ to $s_k$ once or to a message digest with a $k$th digit of 3 by applying $H$ to $s_k$ twice. An attacker could not, however, generate a signature for a message digest with a $k$th digit of 0 as this would require finding some value $y$ such that $H(y) = s_k$, which would not be feasible as long as $H$ is preimage resistant.

In order to protect against the above attack, the Winternitz signature scheme computes a checksum of the message digest and signs the checksum along with the digest. For an $n$-digit message digest, the checksum is computed as $\sum_{k=0}^{n-1}(b - 1 - N_k)$. The checksum is designed so that the value is non-negative and any increase in a digit in the message digest will result in the checksum becoming smaller. This prevents an attacker from creating an effective forgery from a message signature since the attacker can only increase values within the message digest and cannot decrease values within the checksum.

Figure 2 shows an example of a signature for a 32-bit message digest using $b = 16$. The digest is written as eight hexadecimal digits, and a separate hash chain is used to sign each digit with each hash chain having its own private key.[2]

| | Digest | | | | | | | | Checksum | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Digest | 6 | 3 | F | 1 | E | 9 | 0 | B | 3 | D |
| Private Key | $x_0$ | $x_1$ | $x_2$ | $x_3$ | $x_4$ | $x_5$ | $x_6$ | $x_7$ | $x_8$ | $x_9$ |
| Signature | $H^6(x_0)$ | $H^3(x_1)$ | $H^{15}(x_2)$ | $H(x_3)$ | $H^{14}(x_4)$ | $H^9(x_5)$ | $x_6$ | $H^{11}(x_7)$ | $H^3(x_8)$ | $H^{13}(x_9)$ |
| Public Key | $H^{15}(x_0)$ | $H^{15}(x_1)$ | $H^{15}(x_2)$ | $H^{15}(x_3)$ | $H^{15}(x_4)$ | $H^{15}(x_5)$ | $H^{15}(x_6)$ | $H^{15}(x_7)$ | $H^{15}(x_8)$ | $H^{15}(x_9)$ |

**Figure 3: A sample Winternitz signature**

## 3.2 Merkle Trees

While a single, long-term public key could be created from a large set of OTS public keys by

[2] If SHA-256 were used as the hash function, then the message digest would be encoded as 64 hexadecimal digits, and the checksum would be encoded as three hexadecimal digits.

simply concatenating the keys together, the resulting public key would be unacceptably large. XMSS and LMS instead use Merkle hash trees [18], which allow for the long-term public key to be very short in exchange for requiring a small amount of additional information to be provided with each OTS key. To create a hash tree, the OTS public keys are hashed once to form the leaves of the tree, and these hashes are then hashed together in pairs to form the next level up. Those hash values are then hashed together in pairs, the resulting hash values are hashed together, and so on until all of the public keys have been used to generate a single hash value (the root of the tree), which will be used as the long-term public key.




**Figure 4: A Merkle Hash Tree**

Figure 3 depicts a hash tree containing eight OTS public keys ($k_0 \ldots k_7$). The eight keys are each hashed to form the leaves of the tree ($h_0 \ldots h_7$), and the eight leaf values are hashed in pairs to create the next level up in the tree ($h_{01}, h_{23}, h_{45}, h_{67}$). These four hash values are again hashed in pairs to create $h_{0-3}$ and $h_{4-7}$, which are hashed together to create the long-term public key, $h_{0-7}$. In order for an entity that had already received $h_{0-7}$ in a secure manner to verify a message signed using $k_2$, the signer would need to provide $h_3$, $h_{01}$, and $h_{4-7}$ in addition to $k_2$. The verifier would compute $h'_2 = H(k_2)$, $h'_{23} = H(h'_2||h_3)$, $h'_{0-3} = H(h_{01}||h'_{23})$, and $h'_{0-7} = H(h'_{0-3}||h_{4-7})$. If $h'_{0-7}$ is the same as $h_{0-7}$, then $k_2$ may be used to verify the message signature.

### 3.3 Two-Level Trees

Both [1] and [2] define single tree as well as multi-tree variants of their signature schemes. In an instance that involves two levels of trees, as shown in Figure 4, the OTS keys that form the leaves of the top-level tree sign the roots of the trees at the bottom level, and the OTS keys that form the leaves of the bottom-level trees are used to sign the messages. The root of the top-level tree is the long-term public key for the signature scheme.[3]

[3] While this section only describes two-level trees, HSS allows for up to eight levels of trees and XMSS$^{MT}$ allows for up to 12 levels of trees.

As described in Section 7, the use of two levels of trees can make it easier to distribute OTS keys across multiple cryptographic modules in order to protect against private key loss. A set of OTS keys can be created in one cryptographic module, and the root of the Merkle tree formed from these keys can be published as the public key for the signature scheme. OTS keys can then be created on multiple other cryptographic modules with a separate Merkle tree being created for the OTS keys of each of the other cryptographic modules, and a different OTS key from the first cryptographic module can be used to sign each of the roots of the other cryptographic modules.



**Figure 5: A two-Level Merkle tree**

While there are benefits in the use of a two-level tree, it results in larger signatures and slower signature verification as each message signature will need to include two OTS signatures. For example, if a message were signed using OTS key $k_{1b,6}$ in Figure 4, the signature would need to include the signature on $r_{1b,1}$ using $k_{0a,1}$ in addition to the signature on the message using $k_{1b,6}$.

### 3.4 Prefixes and Bitmasks

In order to strengthen the security of the schemes in both XMSS and LMS whenever a value is hashed, a prefix is prepended to the value that is hashed. For example, when computing the public key for a Winternitz signature from the private key in LMS as described in Section 3.1, rather than just computing $pub_k = H^3(x_k) = H\left(H\left(H(x_k)\right)\right)$ the public key is computed as $pub_k = H\left(p_3 \,||\, H\left(p_2 \,||\, H(p_1 \,||\, x_k)\right)\right)$, where $p_1$, $p_2$, and $p_3$ are each different prefix values. The prefix is formed by concatenating together various pieces of information, including a unique identifier for the long-term public key and an indicator of the purpose of the hash (e.g., Winternitz chain or Merkle tree). If the hash is part of a Winternitz chain, then the prefix also includes the number of the OTS key, which digit of the digest or checksum is being signed, and where in the chain the hash appears. The goal is to ensure that every single hash that is computed within the LMS scheme uses a different prefix.

XMSS generates its prefixes in a similar way. The information described above is used to form an address, which uniquely identifies where a particular hash invocation occurs within the scheme. This address is then hashed along with a unique identifier (SEED) for the long-term public key ~~(SEED)~~to create the prefix.

Unlike LMS, XMSS also uses bitmasks. In addition to creating the prefix, a slightly different address is also hashed along with the SEED to create a bitmask. The bitmask is then exclusive-ORed with the input before the input is hashed along with the prefix. Figure 5 illustrates an example of this computation. In [1], the hash function is referred to as H, H_msg, F, or PRF, depending on where it is being used. However, in each case it is the same function, just with a different prefix prepended in order to ensure separation between the uses.




**Figure 6: XMSS hash computation with prefix and bitmask**

# 4 Leighton-Micali Signatures (LMS) Parameter Sets

The LMS and HSS algorithms are described in RFC 8554 [2]. This Special Publication approves the use of LMS and HSS with four different hash functions: SHA-256, SHA-256/192, SHAKE256/256, and SHAKE256/192 (see Section 2.3). The parameter sets that use SHA-256 are defined in RFC 8554 [2]. The parameter sets that use SHA-256/192, SHAKE256/256, and SHAKE256/192 are defined~~below~~ in this publication.

When generating a key pair for an LMS instance, each LM-OTS key in the system **shall** use the same parameter set, and the hash function used for the LMS system **shall** be the same as the hash function used in the LM-OTS keys. The height of the tree (*h*) **shall** be 5, 10, 15, 20, or 25.

When generating a key pair for an HSS instance, the requirements specified in the previous paragraph apply to each LMS tree in the instance. If the HSS instance has more than one level, then the hash function used for the tree at level 0 **shall** be used for every LMS tree at every other level. For each level, the same LMS and LM-OTS parameter sets **shall** be used for every LMS tree at that level. Different LMS and LM-OTS parameter sets may be used at different levels, as long as all chosen parameter sets use the same hash function.

The LMS and LM-OTS parameter sets that are approved for use by this Special Publication are specified in tables in Sections 4.1 through 4.4. The parameters ***n***, ***w***, ***p***, ~~*ls*,~~ ***m***, and ***h*** specified in the tables are defined in Sections 4.1 and 5.1 of [2].

**Commented [LLC4]:** These parameters are defined in THIS document, see Section 2.3. There is no need to refer to [2].

Extensions to the XDR syntax in Section 3.3 of [2] needed to support the parameter sets defined in Sections 4.2 through 4.4 of this document are specified in Appendix A.

## 4.1 LMS with SHA-256

When generating LMS or HSS key pairs using SHA-256, the LMS and LM-OTS parameter sets **shall** be selected from the following two tables, which come from Sections 4 and 5 of [2].

**Table 1: LM-OTS parameter sets for SHA-256**

| LM-OTS Parameter Sets | Numeric Identifier | *n* | *w* | *p* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W1 | 0x00000001 | 32 | 1 | 265 |
| LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W2 | 0x00000002 | 32 | 2 | 133 |
| LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W4 | 0x00000003 | 32 | 4 | 67 |
| LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8 | 0x00000004 | 32 | 8 | 34 |

**Table 2: LMS parameter sets for SHA-256**

| LMS Parameter Sets | Numeric Identifier | *m* | *h* |
|---|---|---|---|
| LMS_SHA256_M32_H5 | 0x00000005 | 32 | 5 |
| LMS_SHA256_M32_H10 | 0x00000006 | 32 | 10 |
| LMS_SHA256_M32_H15 | 0x00000007 | 32 | 15 |
| LMS_SHA256_M32_H20 | 0x00000008 | 32 | 20 |
| LMS_SHA256_M32_H25 | 0x00000009 | 32 | 25 |

## 4.2 LMS with SHA-256/192

When generating LMS or HSS key pairs using SHA-256/192, the LMS and LM-OTS parameter sets **shall** be selected from the following two tables.

**Table 3: LM-OTS parameter sets for SHA-256/192**

| LM-OTS Parameter Sets | Numeric Identifier | *n* | *w* | *p* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LMOTS_SHA256_N24_W1 | TBD | 24 | 1 | 200 |
| LMOTS_SHA256_N24_W2 | TBD | 24 | 2 | 101 |
| LMOTS_SHA256_N24_W4 | TBD | 24 | 4 | 51 |
| LMOTS_SHA256_N24_W8 | TBD | 24 | 8 | 26 |

**Table 4: LMS parameter sets for SHA-256/192**

| LMS Parameter Sets | Numeric Identifier | *m* | *h* |
|---|---|---|---|
| LMS_SHA256_M24_H5 | TBD | 24 | 5 |
| LMS_SHA256_M24_H10 | TBD | 24 | 10 |
| LMS_SHA256_M24_H15 | TBD | 24 | 15 |
| LMS_SHA256_M24_H20 | TBD | 24 | 20 |
| LMS_SHA256_M24_H25 | TBD | 24 | 25 |

### 4.3 LMS with SHAKE256/256

When generating LMS or HSS key pairs using SHAKE256/256, the LMS and LM-OTS parameter sets **shall** be selected from the following two tables.

**Table 5: LM-OTS parameter sets for SHAKE256/256**

| LM-OTS Parameter Sets | Numeric Identifier | *n* | *w* | *p* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LMOTS_SHAKE_N32_W1 | TBD | 32 | 1 | 265 |
| LMOTS_SHAKE_N32_W2 | TBD | 32 | 2 | 133 |
| LMOTS_SHAKE_N32_W4 | TBD | 32 | 4 | 67 |
| LMOTS_SHAKE_N32_W8 | TBD | 32 | 8 | 34 |

**Table 6: LMS parameter sets for SHAKE256/256**

| LMS Parameter Sets | Numeric Identifier | *m* | *h* |
|---|---|---|---|
| LMS_ SHAKE_M32_H5 | TBD | 32 | 5 |
| LMS_ SHAKE_M32_H10 | TBD | 32 | 10 |
| LMS_ SHAKE_M32_H15 | TBD | 32 | 15 |
| LMS_ SHAKE_M32_H20 | TBD | 32 | 20 |
| LMS_ SHAKE_M32_H25 | TBD | 32 | 25 |

### 4.4 LMS with SHAKE256/192

When generating LMS or HSS key pairs using SHAKE256/192, the LMS and LM-OTS parameter sets **shall** be selected from the following two tables.

**Table 7: LM-OTS parameter sets for SHAKE256/192**

| LM-OTS Parameter Sets | Numeric Identifier | *n* | *w* | *p* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LMOTS_SHAKE_N24_W1 | TBD | 24 | 1 | 200 |
| LMOTS_SHAKE_N24_W2 | TBD | 24 | 2 | 101 |
| LMOTS_SHAKE_N24_W4 | TBD | 24 | 4 | 51 |
| LMOTS_SHAKE_N24_W8 | TBD | 24 | 8 | 26 |

**Table 8: LMS parameter sets for SHAKE256/192**

| LMS Parameter Sets | Numeric Identifier | *m* | *h* |
|---|---|---|---|
| LMS_ SHAKE_M24_H5 | TBD | 24 | 5 |
| LMS_ SHAKE_M24_H10 | TBD | 24 | 10 |
| LMS_ SHAKE_M24_H15 | TBD | 24 | 15 |
| LMS_ SHAKE_M24_H20 | TBD | 24 | 20 |
| LMS_ SHAKE_M24_H25 | TBD | 24 | 25 |

# 5 eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS) Parameter Sets

The XMSS and XMSS$^{MT}$ algorithms are described in RFC 8391 [1]. This Special Publication approves the use of XMSS and XMSS$^{MT}$ with four different hash functions: SHA-256, SHA-256/192, SHAKE256/256, and SHAKE256/192 (see Section 2.3).[4] The parameter sets that use SHA-256 are defined in RFC 8391 [1]. The parameter sets that use SHA-256/192, SHAKE256/256, and SHAKE256/192 are defined below.

The WOTS$^{+}$ parameters corresponding to the use of each of these hash functions areis specified in the following table.

**Table 9: WOTS$^{+}$ parameter sets**

| Parameter Sets | Numeric Identifier | F / PRF | *n* | *w* | *len* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WOTSP-SHA2_256 | 0x00000001 | See Section 5.1 | 32 | 16 | 67 |
| WOTSP-SHA2_192 | TBD | See Section 5.2 | 24 | 16 | 51 |
| WOTSP-SHAKE256_256 | TBD | See Section 5.3 | 32 | 16 | 67 |
| WOTSP-SHAKE256_192 | TBD | See Section 5.4 | 24 | 16 | 51 |

The XMSS and XMSS$^{MT}$ parameter sets that are approved for use by this Special Publication are specified in Sections 5.1 through 5.4. The parameters *n*, *w*, *len*, *h*, and *d* specified in the tables are defined in Sections 3.1.1, 4.1.1, and 4.2.1 of [1].

**Commented [LLC5]:** These parameters are defined in THIS document. See Section 3.2.

Extensions to the XDR syntax in Appendices A, B, and C of [1] needed to support the parameter sets defined in Sections 5.2 through 5.4 of this document are specified in Appendix B.

## 5.1 XMSS and XMSS$^{MT}$ with SHA-256

When generating XMSS or XMSS$^{MT}$ key pairs using SHA-256, the parameter sets **shall** be selected from the following two tables, which come from Section 5 of [1]. Each of these uses the WOTSP-SHA2_256 parameter set.

**Table 10: XMSS parameter sets for SHA-256**

| Parameter Sets | Numeric Identifier | *n* | *w* | *len* | *h* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| XMSS-SHA2_10_256 | 0x00000001 | 32 | 16 | 67 | 10 |
| XMSS-SHA2_16_256 | 0x00000002 | 32 | 16 | 67 | 16 |
| XMSS-SHA2_20_256 | 0x000000032 | 32 | 16 | 67 | 20 |

[4] The parameter sets specified in RFC 8391 [1] that use SHAKE128, SHAKE256, and SHA-512 are not approved for use by this Special Publication.

**Table 11: XMSS$^{MT}$ parameter sets for SHA-256**

| Parameter Sets | Numeric Identifier | *n* | *w* | *len* | *h* | *d* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| XMSSMT-SHA2_20/2_256 | 0x00000001 | 32 | 16 | 67 | 20 | 2 |
| XMSSMT-SHA2_20/4_256 | 0x00000002 | 32 | 16 | 67 | 20 | 4 |
| XMSSMT-SHA2_40/2_256 | 0x00000003 | 32 | 16 | 67 | 40 | 2 |
| XMSSMT-SHA2_40/4_256 | 0x00000004 | 32 | 16 | 67 | 40 | 4 |
| XMSSMT-SHA2_40/8_256 | 0x00000005 | 32 | 16 | 67 | 40 | 8 |
| XMSSMT-SHA2_60/3_256 | 0x00000006 | 32 | 16 | 67 | 60 | 3 |
| XMSSMT-SHA2_60/6_256 | 0x00000007 | 32 | 16 | 67 | 60 | 6 |
| XMSSMT-SHA2_60/12_256 | 0x00000008 | 32 | 16 | 67 | 60 | 12 |

For the parameter sets in this section, the functions F, H, H_msg, and PRF are as defined in Section 5.1 of [1] for SHA2 with $n = 32$. The function $PRF_{keygen}$, which is used for key generation as specified in Section 6.2, is defined as follows:

- $PRF_{keygen}$: SHA-256(toByte(4, 4) || KEY || M)

**Commented [LLC6]:** This definition does not indicate what input variables are for the PRF.
Please notice that "KEY" and "M" have not been introduced before.
I understand that they must be used in [1]. But a little bit explanation may be helpful.

## 5.2 XMSS and XMSS$^{MT}$ with SHA-256/192

When generating XMSS or XMSS$^{MT}$ key pairs using SHA-256/192, the parameter sets **shall** be selected from the following two tables. Each of these uses the WOTSP-SHA2_192 parameter set.

**Table 12: XMSS parameter sets for SHA-256/192**

| Parameter Sets | Numeric Identifier | *n* | *w* | *len* | *h* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| XMSS-SHA2_10_192 | TBD | 24 | 16 | 51 | 10 |
| XMSS-SHA2_16_192 | TBD | 24 | 16 | 51 | 16 |
| XMSS-SHA2_20_192 | TBD | 24 | 16 | 51 | 20 |

**Table 13: XMSS$^{MT}$ parameter sets for SHA-256/192**

| Parameter Sets | Numeric Identifier | *n* | *w* | *len* | *h* | *d* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| XMSSMT-SHA2_20/2_192 | TBD | 24 | 16 | 51 | 20 | 2 |
| XMSSMT-SHA2_20/4_192 | TBD | 24 | 16 | 51 | 20 | 4 |
| XMSSMT-SHA2_40/2_192 | TBD | 24 | 16 | 51 | 40 | 2 |
| XMSSMT-SHA2_40/4_192 | TBD | 24 | 16 | 51 | 40 | 4 |
| XMSSMT-SHA2_40/8_192 | TBD | 24 | 16 | 51 | 40 | 8 |
| XMSSMT-SHA2_60/3_192 | TBD | 24 | 16 | 51 | 60 | 3 |
| XMSSMT-SHA2_60/6_192 | TBD | 24 | 16 | 51 | 60 | 6 |
| XMSSMT-SHA2_60/12_192 | TBD | 24 | 16 | 51 | 60 | 12 |

For the parameter sets in this section, the functions F, H, H_msg, ~~and~~ PRF, and $PRF_{keygen}$ are defined as follows:

- F: $T_{192}$(SHA-256(toByte(0, 4) || KEY || M))
- H: $T_{192}$(SHA-256(toByte(1, 4) || KEY || M))
- H_msg: $T_{192}$(SHA-256(toByte(2, 4) || KEY || M))
- PRF: $T_{192}$(SHA-256(toByte(3, 4) || KEY || M))
- $PRF_{keygen}$: $T_{192}$(SHA-256(toByte(4, 4) || KEY || M))

**Commented [LLC7]:** Please notice that "KEY" and "M" have never been explained before. If these functions are used for prefix generation and bitmask generation as described in Figure 6, then how KEY and M be mapped to SEED and ADDR there?

### 5.3 XMSS and XMSS$^{MT}$ with SHAKE256/256

When generating XMSS or XMSS$^{MT}$ key pairs using SHAKE256/256, the parameter sets **shall** be selected from the following two tables. Each of these uses the WOTSP-SHAKE256_256 parameter set.

**Table 14: XMSS parameter sets for SHAKE256/256**

| Parameter Sets | Numeric Identifier | *n* | *w* | *len* | *h* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| XMSS-SHAKE256_10_256 | TBD | 32 | 16 | 67 | 10 |
| XMSS-SHAKE256_16_256 | TBD | 32 | 16 | 67 | 16 |
| XMSS-SHAKE256_20_256 | TBD | 32 | 16 | 67 | 20 |

**Table 15: XMSS$^{MT}$ parameter sets for SHAKE256/256**

| Parameter Sets | Numeric Identifier | *n* | *w* | *len* | *h* | *d* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| XMSSMT-SHAKE256_20/2_256 | TBD | 32 | 16 | 67 | 20 | 2 |
| XMSSMT-SHAKE256_20/4_256 | TBD | 32 | 16 | 67 | 20 | 4 |
| XMSSMT-SHAKE256_40/2_256 | TBD | 32 | 16 | 67 | 40 | 2 |
| XMSSMT-SHAKE256_40/4_256 | TBD | 32 | 16 | 67 | 40 | 4 |
| XMSSMT-SHAKE256_40/8_256 | TBD | 32 | 16 | 67 | 40 | 8 |
| XMSSMT-SHAKE256_60/3_256 | TBD | 32 | 16 | 67 | 60 | 3 |
| XMSSMT-SHAKE256_60/6_256 | TBD | 32 | 16 | 67 | 60 | 6 |
| XMSSMT-SHAKE256_60/12_256 | TBD | 32 | 16 | 67 | 60 | 12 |

For the parameter sets in this section, the functions F, H, H_msg, ~~and~~ PRF, and $PRF_{keygen}$ are defined as follows:

- F: SHAKE256(toByte(0, 32) || KEY || M, 256)
- H: SHAKE256(toByte(1, 32) || KEY || M, 256)
- H_msg: SHAKE256(toByte(2, 32) || KEY || M, 256)
- PRF: SHAKE256(toByte(3, 32) || KEY || M, 256)
- $PRF_{keygen}$: SHAKE256(toByte(4, 32) || KEY || M, 256)

## 5.4 XMSS and XMSS$^{MT}$ with SHAKE256/192

When generating XMSS or XMSS$^{MT}$ key pairs using SHAKE256/192, the parameter sets **shall** be selected from the following two tables. Each of these uses the WOTSP-SHAKE256_192 parameter set.

**Table 16: XMSS parameter sets for SHAKE256/192**

| Parameter Sets | Numeric Identifier | *n* | *w* | *len* | *h* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| XMSS-SHAKE256_10_192 | TBD | 24 | 16 | 51 | 10 |
| XMSS-SHAKE256_16_192 | TBD | 24 | 16 | 51 | 16 |
| XMSS-SHAKE256_20_192 | TBD | 24 | 16 | 51 | 20 |

**Table 17: $XMSS^{MT}$ parameter sets for SHAKE256/192**

| Parameter Sets | Numeric Identifier | *n* | *w* | *len* | *h* | *d* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| XMSSMT-SHAKE256_20/2_192 | TBD | 24 | 16 | 51 | 20 | 2 |
| XMSSMT-SHAKE256_20/4_192 | TBD | 24 | 16 | 51 | 20 | 4 |
| XMSSMT-SHAKE256_40/2_192 | TBD | 24 | 16 | 51 | 40 | 2 |
| XMSSMT-SHAKE256_40/4_192 | TBD | 24 | 16 | 51 | 40 | 4 |
| XMSSMT-SHAKE256_40/8_192 | TBD | 24 | 16 | 51 | 40 | 8 |
| XMSSMT-SHAKE256_60/3_192 | TBD | 24 | 16 | 51 | ~~4~~60 | 3 |
| XMSSMT-SHAKE256_60/6_192 | TBD | 24 | 16 | 51 | ~~4~~60 | 6 |
| XMSSMT-SHAKE256_60/12_192 | TBD | 24 | 16 | 51 | ~~4~~60 | 12 |

For the parameter sets in this section, the functions F, H, H_msg, ~~and~~ PRF, and $PRF_{keygen}$ are defined as follows:

- F: SHAKE256(toByte(0, 4) || KEY || M, 192)
- H: SHAKE256(toByte(1, 4) || KEY || M, 192)
- H_msg: SHAKE256(toByte(2, 4) || KEY || M, 192)
- PRF: SHAKE256(toByte(3, 4) || KEY || M, 192)
- $PRF_{keygen}$: SHAKE256(toByte(4, 4) || KEY || M, 192)

# 6 Random Number Generation for Keys and Signatures

This section specifies requirements for the generation of random data that apply in addition to the requirements that are specified in [2] for LMS and HSS and in [1] for XMSS and $XMSS^{MT}$.

**Note**: Variables and notations used in this section are defined in the relevant documents mentioned above.

## 6.1 LMS and HSS Random Number Generation Requirements

The LMS key pair identifier, *I*, **shall** be generated using an **approved** random bit generator (see the SP 800-90 series of publications [6]) where the instantiation of the random bit generator supports at least 128 bits of security strength.

The *n*-byte private elements of the LM-OTS private keys (x[i] in Section 4.2 of [2]) **shall** be generated using the pseudorandom key generation method specified in Appendix A of [2]. The same SEED value **shall** be used to generate every private element in a single LMS instance, and SEED **shall** be generated using an **approved** random bit generator [6] where the instantiation of the random bit generator supports at least 8*n* bits of security strength.

If more than one LMS instance is being created (e.g., for an HSS instance), then a separate key pair identifier, *I*, and SEED ~~(if using the pseudorandom key generation method)~~ **shall** be generated for each LMS instance.

When generating a signature, the *n*-byte randomizer *C* (see Section 4.5 of [2]) **shall** be generated using an **approved** random bit generator [6] where the instantiation of the random bit generator supports at least 8*n* bits of security strength.

## 6.2 XMSS and $XMSS^{MT}$ Random Number Generation Requirements

The *n*-byte values *SK_PRF* and *SEED* **shall** be generated using an **approved** random bit generator (see the SP 800-90 series of publications [6]) where the instantiation of the random bit generator supports at least 8*n* bits of security strength.

The private *n*-byte strings in the $WOTS^+$ private keys (sk[i] in Section 3.1.3 of [1]) **shall** be generated using the pseudorandom key generation method specified in ~~Section 3.1.7 of [1]~~Algorithm 10' in Section 7.2.1:
sk[~~i,~~ *j*] = $PRF_{keygen}$~~PRF~~(~~S_ots[j]~~*S_XMSS*, ~~toByte(i, 32)~~*SEED* || *ADRS*), where $PRF_{keygen}$ ~~PRF~~ is as defined in Section 5 for the parameter set being used.[5] ~~The private seed, S_ots[j], for each $WOTS^+$ private key, j, shall be as specified in Section 4.1.11 of [1]: S_ots[j] = PRF(S_XMSS, toByte(j, 32)), where PRF is as defined in Section 5 for the parameter set being used.~~ The private seed, *S_XMSS*, **shall** be generated using an **approved** random bit generator [6] where the instantiation of the random bit generator supports at least 8*n* bits of security strength. If more than one XMSS key pair is being created within a cryptographic module (including XMSS keys that belong to a single $XMSS^{MT}$ instance), then a separate random *S_XMSS* **shall** be generated

**Commented [LLC8]:** Notice that here the input variables to the PRF are two strings. Back to Section 5, the assumption might be to concatenate these two variables as input to SHA-256.

[5] For an XMSS key that is not part of an $XMSS^{MT}$ instance, $d = 1$, $L = 0$, and $t = 0$.

for each XMSS key pair.

# 7 Distributed Multi-Tree Hash-Based Signatures

If a digital signature key will be used to generate signatures over a long period of time and replacing the public key would be difficult, then ~~storing the private key in multiple places to protect against loss~~it will be necessary to prepare for the possibility that a cryptographic module holding the private key may fail during the key's lifetime. In the case of most digital signature schemes, ~~this just involves making~~a common solution is to make copies of the private key. However, in the case of stateful HBS schemes, simply copying the private key would create a risk of OTS key reuse.

~~An alternative that avoids this risk is to have multiple cryptographic modules that each generate their own OTS keys and then create a single instance that includes all of the public keys from all of the modules.~~

While it would ~~also~~ be possible to have one cryptographic module generate all of the OTS keys and then distribute different OTS keys to each of the other cryptographic modules, doing so is not an option for cryptographic modules conforming to this recommendation~~. D~~: due to the risks associated with copying OTS keys, this recommendation prohibits exporting private keying material (Section 8).

One option would be to create multiple stateful HBS keys on different cryptographic modules and then configure clients to accept signatures created using any of these keys. These keys could be distributed to clients all at once or a using mechanism such as the Hash Of Root Key certificate extension [23], which provides a mechanism for distributing new public keys over time.

Another option would be to create a single stateful HBS key in which the OTS private keys are distributed across multiple cryptographic modules. The easiest way to have OTS keys on multiple cryptographic modules without exporting private keys is to use HSS or $XMSS^{MT}$ with two levels of trees where the ~~each~~ trees are ~~is~~ instantiated on ~~a~~ different cryptographic modules. First, a top-level LMS or XMSS key pair would be created in a cryptographic module. The top level's OTS keys would only be used to sign the roots of other trees. Then, bottom-level LMS or XMSS key pairs would be created ~~in other cryptographic modules,~~ and the public keys from those key pairs (i.e., the roots of their Merkle trees) would be signed by OTS keys of the top-level key pair. The OTS keys of the bottom-level key pairs would be used to sign ordinary messages. The number of bottom-level key pairs that could be created would only be limited by the number of OTS keys in the top-level key pair.

As an example, suppose that an organization wishes to have a single $XMSS^{MT}$ key with the OTS private keys being distributed across two cryptographic modules (in case one fails), and the organization has determined that at most 10 000 signatures will need to be generated over the lifetime of the $XMSS^{MT}$ key. The organization could create a top-level XMSS key pair on one cryptographic module using the XMSSMT-SHA2_20/2_256 parameter set and could then create 10 bottom-level XMSS keys on that same cryptographic module. An additional 10 bottom-level XMSS keys could be created on a second cryptographic module, with all 20 of the bottom-levels keys being signed by OTS keys of the top-level key pair.

When working with distributed multi-tree hash-based signatures, the cryptographic module holding the top-level tree is a potential single point of failure. Once this cryptographic module fails it is no longer possible to sign the additional bottom-level key pairs. So, all of the bottom-level keys should be generated up-front as part of the initial key generation ceremony. Once the top-level key has been used to sign all of the bottom-level keys, the top-level key is no longer needed, as copies of the signatures created using OTS keys of the top-level key pair may be stored outside of the cryptographic module.

In order to avoid the top-level key being a single point of failure, the two options described above could be combined to create multiple distributed multi-tree HBS keys. Multiple top-level keys pairs would initially be created, each on a different cryptographic module, and clients would be configured to accept signatures created using any of these keys. Then, whenever a new bottom-level key needed to be created, it could be signed by any one of the top-level keys. This would allow for new bottom-level keys to be created as long as at least one of the cryptographic modules containing a top-level key remained operational. Of course, the same level of care should be used in signing a bottom-level key as would be used during the initial key generation ceremony (or as would be used in making a copy of an RSA or ECDSA private key).

### 7.1 HSS

In the case of HSS, the distributed multi-tree scheme described above can be implemented using multiple cryptographic modules that each implement LMS without modifications. The top-level LMS public key can be converted to an HSS public key by an external, non-cryptographic device. This device can also submit the public keys of the bottom-level LMS keys to be signed by the top-level LMS key. In HSS, the operation for signing the root of a lower-level tree is the same as the operation for signing an ordinary message. Finally, this external device can submit ordinary messages to cryptographic modules holding the bottom-level LMS keys for signing and then combine the resulting LMS signatures with the top-level key's signature on the bottom-level LMS public key in order to create the HSS signature for the ordinary messages (see Algorithm 7~~8~~ and Algorithm 8~~9~~ in [2]).

### 7.2 XMSS$^{MT}$

Distributing the implementation of an XMSS$^{MT}$ instance across multiple cryptographic modules requires each cryptographic module to implement slightly modified versions of the XMSS key and signature generation algorithms provided in [1]. The modified versions of these algorithms are provided in Section 7.2.1. The modifications are primarily intended to ensure that each XMSS key uses the appropriate values for its layer and tree addresses when computing prefixes and bitmasks. The modifications also ensure that every XMSS key uses the same value for SEED and that the root of the top-level tree is used when computing the hashes of messages to be signed.

Note that while Algorithm 15 in [1] indicates that an XMSS$^{MT}$ secret key has a single *SK_PRF* value that is shared by all of the XMSS secret keys, Algorithm 10' in Section 7.2.1 has each cryptographic module generate its own value for *SK_PRF*. While generating a different *SK_PRF* for each cryptographic module does not exactly align with the specification in [1], doing so does not affect either interoperability or security. *SK_PRF* is only used to pseudorandomly generate the value *r* in Algorithm 16, which is used for randomized hashing, and any secure method for generating random values could be used to generate *r*.

Section 7.2.2 describes the steps that an external, non-cryptographic device needs to perform in order to implement XMSS$^{MT}$ key and signature generation using a set of cryptographic modules that implement the algorithms in Section 7.2.1. While Algorithms 10' and 12' in Section 7.2.1 have been designed to work with XMSS$^{MT}$ instances that have more than two layers, the algorithms in Section 7.2.2 assume that an XMSS$^{MT}$ instance with exactly two layers is being created.

### 7.2.1 Modified XMSS Key Generation and Signature Algorithms

```
Algorithm 10': XMSS'_keyGen

  // L needs to be in the range [0 … d-1]
  // t needs to be in the range [0 … 2^((d-1-L)(h/d)) - 1]
  Input: level L, tree t,
         public key of top-level tree PK_MT (if L ≠ d - 1)
  Output: XMSS public key PK

  Initialize S_XMSS with an n-byte string using an approved
  random bit generator [6], where the instantiation of the
  random bit generator supports at least 8n bits of security
  strength;

  // SEED needs to be generated for the top-level XMSS key.
  // For all other XMSS keys, the value needs to be copied from
  // the top-level XMSS key.
  if ( L = d - 1 ) {
    Initialize SEED with an n-byte string using an approved
    random bit generator [6], where the instantiation of the
    random bit generator supports at least 8n bits of security
    strength;
  } else {
    SEED = getSEED(PK_MT);
  }
  setSEED(SK, SEED);

  ADRS = toByte(0, 32);
  ADRS.setLayerAddress(L);
  ADRS.setTreeAddress(t);

  // Example initialization for SK-specific contents
  idx = t * 2^(h / d);
  for ( i = 0; i < 2^(h / d); i++ ) {
    ADRS.setOTSAddress(i);
    // For each OTS key, i, generate the private key value for
    // chain in the OTS key.
    for ( j=0; j < len; j++) {
```

```
      ADRS.setChainAddress(j);
      sk[j] = PRF_keygen(S_XMSS, SEED || ADRS);
    }
    // Set the secret key for OTS key i to the array of len
    // private key values generated for that key.
    wots_sk[i] = WOTS_genSK()sk;
  }
  setWOTS_SK(SK, wots_sk);

  Initialize SK_PRF with an n-byte string using an approved
  random bit generator [6], where the instantiation of the
  random bit generator supports at least 8n bits of security
  strength;.
  setSK_PRF(SK, SK_PRF);

  // SEED needs to be generated for the top-level XMSS key.
  // For all other XMSS keys, the value needs to be copied from
  // the top level XMSS key.
  if ( L = d - 1 ) {
    Initialize SEED with an n-byte string using an approved
    random bit generator [6], where the instantiation of the
    random bit generator supports at least 8n bits of security
    strength;.
  } else {
    SEED = getSEED(PK_MT);
  }
  setSEED(SK, SEED);
  setWOTS_SK(SK, wots_sk);
  ADRS = toByte(0, 32);
  ADRS.setLayerAddress(L);
  ADRS.setTreeAddress(t);
  root = treeHash(SK, 0, h / d, ADRS);

  setLayerAddress(SK, L);
  setTreeAddress(SK, t);
  setIdx(SK, idx);

  // The "root" value in SK needs to be the root of the top-level
  // XMSS tree, as this is the value used when hashing the message
  // to be signed.
  if ( L = d - 1 ) {
    setRoot(SK, root);
    SK = L || t || idx || wots_sk || SK_PRF || root || SEED;
  } else {
    setRoot(SK, getRoot(PK_MT));
    SK = L || t || idx || wots_sk || SK_PRF || getRoot(PK_MT) || SEED;
  }
```

```
  // The public key should be encoded using the XDR for
  // xmssmt public key in Appendix C.3 of [1], with the additions
  // specified in Appendix B.3 of this document.
  PK = OID || root || SEED;
  return PK;
```

```
Algorithm 12': XMSS'_sign

  Input: Message M
  Output: signature Sig

  idx_sig = getIdx(SK);
  setIdx(SK, idx_sig + 1);
  L = getLayerAddress(SK);
  t = getTreeAddress(SK);
  ADRS = toByte(0, 32);
  ADRS.setLayerAddress(L);
  ADRS.setTreeAddress(t);

  if ( L > 0 ) {
    // M must be the n-byte root from an XMSS public key
    byte[n] r = 0; // n-byte string of zeros
    byte[n] M' = M;
  } else {
    byte[n] r = PRF(getSK_PRF(SK), toByte(idx_sig, 32));
    byte[n] M' = H_msg(r || getRoot(SK) || (toByte(idx_sig, n)), M);
  }
  idx_leaf = idx_sig - t * 2^(h / d);
  Sig = idx_sig || r || treeSig(M', SK, idx_leaf, ADRS);
  return Sig;
```

#### 7.2.2 XMSS$^{MT}$ External Device Operations

```
XMSS^MT external device keygen

  Input: No input

  // Generate top-level key pair on a cryptographic module
  PK_MT = XMSS'_keyGen(1, 0, NULL);

  t = 0;
  for each bottom-level key pair to be created {
    // Generate bottom-level key pair on a cryptographic module
    PK[t] = XMSS’_keygen(0, t, PK_MT);

    // Submit root of bottom-level key pair’s public key
    // to be signed by the top-level key pair.
    SigPK[t] = XMSS'_sign(getRoot(PK[t]));
```

```
    // If the public key on the bottom-level tree was created using
    // a tree address of t, then its root needs to be signed by OTS
    // key t of the top-level tree. If it wasn’t, then try again.[6]
    if while ( getIdx(SigPK[t]) ≠ t ) {
      t = getIdx(SigPK[t]) + 1;
      PK[t] = XMSS'_keygen(0, t, PK_MT);
      SigPK[t] = XMSS'_sign(getRoot(PK[t]));
    }
    t = t + 1;
  }
```

```
XMSS^MT external device sign

  Input: Message M
  Output: signature Sig

  // Send XMSS'_sign() command to one of the bottom-level key pairs
  Sig_tmp = XMSS'_sign(M);

  idx_sig = getIdx(Sig_tmp);

  // Determine which bottom-level tree was used to sign the message
  // by extracting at the most significant bits of idx sig.
  t = [idx sig – (idx sig mod 2^(h / d))]/ 2^(h / d)) most
significant bits of idx_sig;

  // Append the signature of the signing key pair's root
  // (just the output of treeSig, not idx_sig or r).
  Sig = Sig_tmp || getSig(SigPK[t]);
  return Sig;
```

[6] While the signing cryptographic module should use its one-time keys sequentially, making it possible for the external device to determine in advance which one-time key will be used to sign the public key of bottom-level tree, the external device cannot specify to the signing cryptographic module which one-time key it should use. So, there is a small chance that an internal glitch in the signing cryptographic will cause it to skip over one or more key indices and sign the bottom-level’s public key using an unexpected key index. While this event should be rare, if it does happen, the only option is to regenerate the bottom-level key pair, setting the tree address to the next expected key index, and then try again.

# 8 Conformance

## 8.1 Key Generation and Signature Generation

Cryptographic modules implementing signature generation for a parameter set **shall** also implement key generation for that parameter set. Implementations of the key generation and signature algorithms in this document **shall** only be validated for use within hardware cryptographic modules. The cryptographic modules **shall** be validated to provide FIPS 140-2 or FIPS 140-3 [19] Level 3 or higher physical security, and the operational environment **shall** be *limited*.[7] In addition, a cryptographic module implementing the key generation or signature algorithms **shall** only operate in an **approved** mode of operation and **shall not** implement a bypass mode. The cryptographic module **shall not** allow for the export of private keying material. The entropy source for any **approved** random bit generator [6] used in the implementation **shall** be located inside the cryptographic module's physical boundary.

In order to prevent the possible reuse of an OTS key, when the cryptographic module accepts a request to sign a message, the cryptographic module **shall** ~~update~~ increment the ~~state~~ leaf index of the private key ($q$ in LMS, $idx$ in XMSS, $idx\_sig$ in XMSS$^{MT}$) and **shall** store the incremented leaf index value in nonvolatile storage before exporting a signature value or accepting another request to sign a message. The cryptographic module **shall not** use an OTS key to generate a digital signature more than one time.[8]

Cryptographic modules implementing LMS key and signature generation **shall** support at least one of the LM-OTS parameter sets in Section 4. For each LM-OTS parameter set supported by a cryptographic module, the cryptographic module **shall** support at least one LMS parameter set from Section 4 that uses the same hash function as the LM-OTS parameter set. Cryptographic modules implementing LMS key and signature generation **shall** generate random data in accordance with Section 6.1.

Cryptographic modules implementing XMSS key and signature generation **shall** implement Algorithm 10 and Algorithm 12 from [1] for at least one of the XMSS parameter sets in Section 5. (The WOTS+ key generation method specified in Algorithm 10' in Section 7.2.1 **shall** be used.) Cryptographic modules supporting implementation of XMSS$^{MT}$ key and signature generation **shall** implement Algorithm 10' and Algorithm 12' from Section 7.2.1 of this document for at least one of the XMSS$^{MT}$ parameter sets in Section 5. Cryptographic modules implementing XMSS or XMSS$^{MT}$ key and signature generation **shall** generate random data in accordance with Section 6.2.

---

[7] See Section 4.6 of FIPS 140-2 [19].

[8] In some implementations of HSS or XMSS$^{MT}$ (e.g., Algorithm 16 in [1]), the root of the LMS or XMSS tree used to create the signature is signed by its parent each time a signature is generated. This results in an OTS key being used to generate a digital signature more than once. While the OTS key is used more than once, the message being signed is the same, and so the result is to just recreate the same signature (as long as the randomizer value is the same each time). However, as noted in [9] and [10], such implementations are vulnerable to fault injection attacks. Implementations compliant with this document must sign the root of each tree only once. The resulting signature may be stored within the cryptographic module or it may be exported from the cryptographic module for storage elsewhere.

## 8.2 Signature Verification

Cryptographic modules implementing LMS signature verification **shall** support at least one of the LM-OTS parameter sets in Section 4. For each LM-OTS parameter set supported by a cryptographic module, the cryptographic module **shall** support at least one LMS parameter set from Section 4 that uses the same hash function as the LM-OTS parameter set.

Cryptographic modules implementing XMSS signature verification **shall** implement Algorithm 14 of [1] for at least one of the parameter sets in Section 5. Cryptographic modules implementing $XMSS^{MT}$ signature verification **shall** implement Algorithm 17 of [1] for at least one of the parameter sets in Section 5.

# 9 Security Considerations

## 9.1 One-Time Signature Key Reuse

Both LMS and XMSS are stateful signature schemes. If an attacker were able to obtain signatures for two different messages created using the same one-time signature (OTS) key, then it would become computationally feasible for that attacker to create forgeries [13]. As noted in [8], extreme care needs to be taken in order to avoid the risk that an OTS key will be reused accidentally. While the conformance requirements in Section 8.1 prevent many of the actions that could result in accidental OTS key reuse, cryptographic modules still need to be carefully designed to ensure that unexpected behavior cannot result in an OTS key being reused.

In order to avoid reuse of an OTS key, the state of the private key must be updated each time a signature is generated. If the private key is stored in nonvolatile memory, then the state of the key must be updated in the nonvolatile memory to mark an OTS key as unavailable before the corresponding signature generated using the OTS key is exported. Depending on the environment, this can be nontrivial to implement. With many operating systems, simply writing the update to a file is not sufficient as the write operation will be cached with the actual write to nonvolatile memory taking place later. If the cryptographic module loses power or crashes before the write to nonvolatile memory, then the state update will be lost. If a signature were exported after the write operation was issued but before the update was written to nonvolatile memory, there would be a risk that the OTS key would be used again after the cryptographic module starts up.

Some hardware cryptographic modules implement monotonic counters, which are guaranteed to increase each time the counter's value is read. When available, using the current value of a monotonic counter to determine which OTS key to use for a signature may be very helpful in avoiding unintentional reuse of an OTS key.

## ~~9.2 Fault Injection Resistance~~

~~Fault injection attacks involve the intentional introduction of an error at some point during the execution of an algorithm, such as by varying the voltage supplied to a device executing the algorithm, causing it to produce the wrong output, and providing the attacker with additional information. These attacks are most relevant for users of embedded cryptographic devices where an adversary may have physical access to the signing device and thus can control its operations.~~

~~Fault injection attacks have been shown to be effective against hash-based signatures, though they are more severe when used against stateless schemes like SPHINCS and its variants [9][10]. With hash-based signatures, the attack works by forcing the cryptographic device to sign two different messages with the same OTS key. The attack takes advantage of the schemes where multiple levels of Merkle trees are used and the roots of lower-level trees are signed using a one-time signature (XMSS$^{MT}$ and HSS) [10]. In some cases, the signatures on these roots are recomputed each time a message is signed. Under normal circumstances, this is acceptable since it just involves using an OTS key multiple times to sign the same message. However, by injecting a fault that introduces an error in the computation of the Merkle tree root at any of the non-top layers, an attacker can cause the device to sign a different message under the same key. With both a valid and a faulty signature, the attacker can "graft" a new subtree into the hierarchy~~

~~and produce universal forgeries.~~

~~The faulted signature remains a valid signature, so checking that the signature verifies is insufficient to detect or prevent this attack. The only reliable way to prevent this attack is to compute each one-time signature once, cache the result, and output it whenever needed. When implementing multiple levels of trees as described in Section 7, this is the only option since no cryptographic module will use any OTS more than once. If multiple levels of trees are implemented within a single cryptographic module, it is recommended to cache a single, one-time signature per layer of subtrees, refreshing them when a new subtree is used for signing [10]. While this prevents an attacker from learning about the secret key when a corrupted signature is cached, it does result in the cached one-time signature being incorrect and thus prevents the hash-based signature scheme from working.~~

### ~~9.3~~9.2 Hash Collisions

In LMS and XMSS, as in the other **approved** digital signature schemes [4], the signature generation algorithm is not applied directly to the message but to a *message digest* generated by the underlying hash function. The security of any signature scheme depends on the inability of an attacker to find distinct messages with the same message digest.

There are two ways that an attacker might find these distinct messages. The attacker could look for a message that has the same message digest as a message that has already been signed (a second preimage), or the attacker could look for any two messages that have the same message digest (a generic collision) and then try to get the private key holder (i.e., signer) to sign one of them [21]. Finding a second preimage is much more difficult than finding a generic collision, and it would be infeasible for an attacker to find a second preimage with any of the hash functions allowed for use in this recommendation.

LMS and XMSS both use randomized hashing. When a message is presented to be signed, a random value is created and prepended to the message, and the hash function is applied to this expanded message to produce the message digest. Prepending the random value makes it infeasible for anyone other than the signer to find a generic collision as finding a collision would require predicting the randomizing value. The randomized hashing process does not, however, impact the ability for a signer to create a generic collision since the signer, knowing the private key, could choose the random value to prepend to the message.

The 192~~6~~-bit hash functions in this recommendation, SHA-256/192~~6~~ and SHAKE256/192~~6~~, offer significantly less resistance to generic collision searches than their 256-bit counterparts. In particular, a collision of the 192~~6~~-bit functions may be found as the number of sampled inputs approaches $2^{96}$, as opposed to $2^{128}$ for the 256-bit functions, and it may be possible for a signer with access to an extremely large amount of computing resources to sample $2^{96}$ inputs.

Consequently, one tradeoff for the use of 192~~6~~-bit hash functions in LMS and XMSS is the weakening of the verifier's assurance that the signer will not be able to change the message once the signature is revealed. This possibility does not affect the formal security properties of the schemes because it remains the case that only the signer could produce a valid signature on a message.

## 9.3 Revocation

Although procedures for the revocation of a compromised key are out of the scope of this publication, the implementation of any signature scheme in principle should include such a procedure [22]. For implementations of stateful hash-based signature schemes, which would be vulnerable in the event of the OTS key reuse, revocation procedures would be arguably even more important.

In practice, however, procedures for revocation that are timely, efficient, and robust are often difficult to implement. For applications with the characteristics described in Section 1.1, the difficulties would likely be magnified.

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## Appendix A—LMS XDR Syntax Additions

In order to support the LM-OTS and LMS parameter sets defined in Sections 4.2 through 4.4, the XDR syntax in Section 3.3 of [2] is extended as follows. For data structures of type `enum` or `union` below, the values or case statements specified in this appendix are to be added to the ones specified in Section 3.3 of [2].

```
/* one-time signatures */

enum lmots_algorithm_type {
  lmots_sha256_n24_w1 = TBD,
  lmots_sha256_n24_w2 = TBD,
  lmots_sha256_n24_w4 = TBD,
  lmots_sha256_n24_w8 = TBD,
  lmots_shake_n32_w1  = TBD,
  lmots_shake_n32_w2  = TBD,
  lmots_shake_n32_w4  = TBD,
  lmots_shake_n32_w8  = TBD,
  lmots_shake_n24_w1  = TBD,
  lmots_shake_n24_w2  = TBD,
  lmots_shake_n24_w4  = TBD,
  lmots_shake_n24_w8  = TBD
};

typedef opaque bytestring24[24];

struct lmots_signature_n24_p200 {
  bytestring24 C;
  bytestring24 y[200];
};

struct lmots_signature_n24_p101 {
  bytestring24 C;
  bytestring24 y[101];
};

struct lmots_signature_n24_p51 {
  bytestring24 C;
  bytestring24 y[51];
};

struct lmots_signature_n24_p26 {
  bytestring24 C;
  bytestring24 y[26];
};

union lmots_signature switch (lmots_algorithm_type type) {
```

```
  case lmots_sha256_n24_w1:
    lmots_signature_n24_p200 sig_n24_p200;
  case lmots_sha256_n24_w2:
    lmots_signature_n24_p101 sig_n24_p101;
  case lmots_sha256_n24_w4:
    lmots_signature_n24_p51  sig_n24_p51;
  case lmots_sha256_n24_w8:
    lmots_signature_n24_p26  sig_n24_p26;
  case lmots_shake_n32_w1:
    lmots_signature_n32_p265 sig_n32_p265;
  case lmots_shake_n32_w2:
    lmots_signature_n32_p133 sig_n32_p133;
  case lmots_shake_n32_w4:
    lmots_signature_n32_p67  sig_n32_p67;
  case lmots_shake_n32_w8:
    lmots_signature_n32_p34  sig_n32_p34;
  case lmots_shake_n24_w1:
    lmots_signature_n24_p200 sig_n24_p200;
  case lmots_shake_n24_w2:
    lmots_signature_n24_p101 sig_n24_p101;
  case lmots_shake_n24_w4:
    lmots_signature_n24_p51  sig_n24_p51;
  case lmots_shake_n24_w8:
    lmots_signature_n24_p26  sig_n24_p26;
};

/* hash-based signatures (hbs) */

enum lms_algorithm_type {
  lms_sha256_n24_h5  = TBD,
  lms_sha256_n24_h10 = TBD,
  lms_sha256_n24_h15 = TBD,
  lms_sha256_n24_h20 = TBD,
  lms_sha256_n24_h25 = TBD,
  lms_shake_n32_h5   = TBD,
  lms_shake_n32_h10  = TBD,
  lms_shake_n32_h15  = TBD,
  lms_shake_n32_h20  = TBD,
  lms_shake_n32_h25  = TBD,
  lms_shake_n24_h5   = TBD,
  lms_shake_n24_h10  = TBD,
  lms_shake_n24_h15  = TBD,
  lms_shake_n24_h20  = TBD,
  lms_shake_n24_h25  = TBD
};

/* leighton-micali signatures (lms) */
```

```
union lms_path switch (lmS_algorithm_type type) {
 case lms_sha256_n24_h5:
 case lms_shake_n24_h5:
   bytestring24 path_n24_h5[5];
 case lms_sha256_n24_h10:
 case lms_shake_n24_h10:
   bytestring24 path_n24_h10[10];
 case lms_sha256_n24_h15:
 case lms_shake_n24_h15:
   bytestring24 path_n24_h15[15];
 case lms_sha256_n24_h20:
 case lms_shake_n24_h20:
   bytestring24 path_n24_h20[20];
 case lms_sha256_n24_h25:
 case lms_shake_n24_h25:
   bytestring24 path_n24_h25[25];

 case lms_shake_n32_h5:
   bytestring32 path_n32_h5[5];
 case lms_shake_n32_h10:
   bytestring32 path_n32_h10[10];
 case lms_shake_n32_h15:
   bytestring32 path_n32_h15[15];
 case lms_shake_n32_h20:
   bytestring32 path_n32_h20[20];
 case lms_shake_n32_h25:
   bytestring32 path_n32_h25[25];
};

struct lms_key_n24 {
  lmots_algorithm_type ots_alg_type;
  opaque I[16];
  opaque K[24];
};

union lms_public_key switch (lms_algorithm_type type) {
 case lms_sha256_n24_h5:
 case lms_sha256_n24_h10:
 case lms_sha256_n24_h15:
 case lms_sha256_n24_h20:
 case lms_sha256_n24_h25:
 case lms_shake_n24_h5:
 case lms_shake_n24_h10:
 case lms_shake_n24_h15:
 case lms_shake_n24_h20:
 case lms_shake_n24_h25:
```

```
        lms_key_n24 z_n24;

   case lms_shake_n32_h5:
   case lms_shake_n32_h10:
   case lms_shake_n32_h15:
   case lms_shake_n32_h20:
   case lms_shake_n32_h25:
        lms_key_n32 z_n32;
  };
```

# Appendix B—XMSS XDR Syntax Additions

In order to support the XMSS parameter sets defined in Sections 5.2 through 5.4, the XDR syntax in Appendices A, B, and C of [1] is extended as follows. For data structures of type `enum` or `union` below, the values or case statements specified in this appendix are to be added to the ones specified in Appendices A, B, and C of [1].

## B.1 WOTS+

```
/* ots_algorithm_type identifies a particular
   signature algorithm */

enum ots_algorithm_type {
  wotsp-sha2_192     = TBD,
  wotsp-shake256_256 = TBD,
  wotsp-shake256_192 = TBD,
};

/* Byte strings */

typedef opaque bytestring24[24];

union ots_signature switch (ots_algorithm_type type) {

  case wotsp-sha2_192:
  case wotsp-shake256_192:
    bytestring24 ots_sig_n24_len51[51];

  case wotsp-shake256_256:
    bytestring32 ots_sig_n32_len67[67];
};

union ots_pubkey switch (ots_algorithm_type type) {
  case wotsp-sha2_192:
  case wotsp-shake256_192:
    bytestring24 ots_pubk_n24_len51[51];

  case wotsp-shake256_256:
    bytestring32 ots_pubk_n32_len67[67];
};
```

## B.2 XMSS

```
/* Definition of parameter sets */

enum xmss_algorithm_type {
  xmss-sha2_10_192      = TBD,
  xmss-sha2_16_192      = TBD,
```

```
    xmss-sha2_20_192      = TBD,

    xmss-shake256_10_256  = TBD,
    xmss-shake256_16_256  = TBD,
    xmss-shake256_20_256  = TBD,

    xmss-shake256_10_192  = TBD,
    xmss-shake256_16_192  = TBD,
    xmss-shake256_20_192  = TBD,
  };

  /* Authentication path types */

  union xmss_path switch (xmss_algorithm_type type) {
    case xmss-sha2_10_192:
    case xmss-shake256_10_192:
      bytestring24 path_n24_t10[10];

    case xmss-shake256_10_256:
      bytestring32 path_n32_t10[10];

    case xmss-sha2_16_192:
    case xmss-shake256_16_192:
      bytestring24 path_n24_t16[16];

    case xmss-shake256_16_256:
      bytestring32 path_n32_t16[16];

    case xmss-sha2_20_192:
    case xmss-shake256_20_192:
      bytestring24 path_n24_t20[20];

    case xmss-shake256_20_256:
      bytestring32 path_n32_t20[20];
  };

  /* Types for XMSS random strings */

  union random_string_xmss switch (xmss_algorithm_type type) {
    case xmss-sha2_10_192:
    case xmss-sha2_16_192:
    case xmss-sha2_20_192:
    case xmss-shake256_10_192:
    case xmss-shake256_16_192:
    case xmss-shake256_20_192:
      bytestring24 rand_n24;

```

```
  case xmss-shake256_10_256:
  case xmss-shake256_16_256:
  case xmss-shake256_20_256:
    bytestring32 rand_n32;
};

/* Corresponding WOTS+ type for given XMSS type */

union xmss_ots_signature switch (xmss_algorithm_type type) {
  case xmss-sha2_10_192:
  case xmss-sha2_16_192:
  case xmss-sha2_20_192:
    wotsp-sha2_192;

  case xmss-shake256_10_256:
  case xmss-shake256_16_256:
  case xmss-shake256_20_256:
    wotsp-shake256_256;

  case xmss-shake256_10_192:
  case xmss-shake256_16_192:
  case xmss-shake256_20_192:
    wotsp-shake256_192;
};

/* Types for bitmask seed */

union seed switch (xmss_algorithm_type type) {
  case xmss-sha2_10_192:
  case xmss-sha2_16_192:
  case xmss-sha2_20_192:
  case xmss-shake256_10_192:
  case xmss-shake256_16_192:
  case xmss-shake256_20_192:
    bytestring24 seed_n24;

  case xmss-shake256_10_256:
  case xmss-shake256_16_256:
  case xmss-shake256_20_256:
    bytestring32 seed_n32;
};

/* Types for XMSS root node */

union xmss_root switch (xmss_algorithm_type type) {
  case xmss-sha2_10_192:
  case xmss-sha2_16_192:
```

```
  case xmss-sha2_20_192:
  case xmss-shake256_10_192:
  case xmss-shake256_16_192:
  case xmss-shake256_20_192:
    bytestring24 root_n24;

  case xmss-shake256_10_256:
  case xmss-shake256_16_256:
  case xmss-shake256_20_256:
    bytestring32 root_n32;
};
```

### B.3 XMSS$^{MT}$

```
/* Definition of parameter sets */

enum xmssmt_algorithm_type {

  xmssmt-sha2_20/2_192      = TBD,
  xmssmt-sha2_20/4_192      = TBD,
  xmssmt-sha2_40/2_192      = TBD,
  xmssmt-sha2_40/4_192      = TBD,
  xmssmt-sha2_40/8_192      = TBD,
  xmssmt-sha2_60/3_192      = TBD,
  xmssmt-sha2_60/6_192      = TBD,
  xmssmt-sha2_60/12_192     = TBD,

  xmssmt-shake256_20/2_256  = TBD,
  xmssmt-shake256_20/4_256  = TBD,
  xmssmt-shake256_40/2_256  = TBD,
  xmssmt-shake256_40/4_256  = TBD,
  xmssmt-shake256_40/8_256  = TBD,
  xmssmt-shake256_60/3_256  = TBD,
  xmssmt-shake256_60/6_256  = TBD,
  xmssmt-shake256_60/12_256 = TBD,

  xmssmt-shake256_20/2_192  = TBD,
  xmssmt-shake256_20/4_192  = TBD,
  xmssmt-shake256_40/2_192  = TBD,
  xmssmt-shake256_40/4_192  = TBD,
  xmssmt-shake256_40/8_192  = TBD,
  xmssmt-shake256_60/3_192  = TBD,
  xmssmt-shake256_60/6_192  = TBD,
  xmssmt-shake256_60/12_192 = TBD,
};

/* Type for XMSS^MT key pair index */
```

```
/* Depends solely on h */

union idx_sig_xmssmt switch (xmss_algorithm_type type) {
  case xmssmt-sha2_20/2_192:
  case xmssmt-sha2_20/4_192:
  case xmssmt-shake256_20/2_256:
  case xmssmt-shake256_20/4_256:
  case xmssmt-shake256_20/2_192:
  case xmssmt-shake256_20/4_192:
    bytestring3 idx3;

  case xmssmt-sha2_40/2_192:
  case xmssmt-sha2_40/4_192:
  case xmssmt-sha2_40/8_192:
  case xmssmt-shake256_40/2_256:
  case xmssmt-shake256_40/4_256:
  case xmssmt-shake256_40/8_256:
  case xmssmt-shake256_40/2_192:
  case xmssmt-shake256_40/4_192:
  case xmssmt-shake256_40/8_192:
    bytestring5 idx5;

  case xmssmt-sha2_60/3_192:
  case xmssmt-sha2_60/6_192:
  case xmssmt-sha2_60/12_192:
  case xmssmt-shake256_60/3_256:
  case xmssmt-shake256_60/6_256:
  case xmssmt-shake256_60/12_256:
  case xmssmt-shake256_60/3_192:
  case xmssmt-shake256_60/6_192:
  case xmssmt-shake256_60/12_192:
    bytestring8 idx8;
};

union random_string_xmssmt switch (xmssmt_algorithm_type type) {
  case xmssmt-sha2_20/2_192:
  case xmssmt-sha2_20/4_192:
  case xmssmt-sha2_40/2_192:
  case xmssmt-sha2_40/4_192:
  case xmssmt-sha2_40/8_192:
  case xmssmt-sha2_60/3_192:
  case xmssmt-sha2_60/6_192:
  case xmssmt-sha2_60/12_192:
  case xmssmt-shake256_20/2_192:
  case xmssmt-shake256_20/4_192:
  case xmssmt-shake256_40/2_192:
  case xmssmt-shake256_40/4_192:
```

```
    case xmssmt-shake256_40/8_192:
    case xmssmt-shake256_60/3_192:
    case xmssmt-shake256_60/6_192:
    case xmssmt-shake256_60/12_192:
      bytestring24 rand_n24;

    case xmssmt-shake256_20/2_256:
    case xmssmt-shake256_20/4_256:
    case xmssmt-shake256_40/2_256:
    case xmssmt-shake256_40/4_256:
    case xmssmt-shake256_40/8_256:
    case xmssmt-shake256_60/3_256:
    case xmssmt-shake256_60/6_256:
    case xmssmt-shake256_60/12_256:
      bytestring32 rand_n32;
  };

  /* Type for reduced XMSS signatures */

  union xmss_reduced (xmss_algorithm_type type) {
    case xmssmt-sha2_20/2_192:
    case xmssmt-sha2_40/4_192:
    case xmssmt-sha2_60/6_192:
    case xmssmt-shake256_20/2_192:
    case xmssmt-shake256_40/4_192:
    case xmssmt-shake256_60/6_192:
      bytestring24 xmss_reduced_n24_t61[61];

    case xmssmt-sha2_20/4_192:
    case xmssmt-sha2_40/8_192:
    case xmssmt-sha2_60/12_192:
    case xmssmt-shake256_20/4_192:
    case xmssmt-shake256_40/8_192:
    case xmssmt-shake256_60/12_192:
      bytestring24 xmss_reduced_n24_t56[56];

    case xmssmt-sha2_40/2_192:
    case xmssmt-sha2_60/3_192:
    case xmssmt-shake256_40/2_192:
    case xmssmt-shake256_60/3_192:
      bytestring24 xmss_reduced_n24_t71[71];

    case xmssmt-shake256_20/2_256:
    case xmssmt-shake256_40/4_256:
    case xmssmt-shake256_60/6_256:
      bytestring32 xmss_reduced_n32_t77[77];
```

```
    case xmssmt-shake256_20/4_256:
    case xmssmt-shake256_40/8_256:
    case xmssmt-shake256_60/12_256:
      bytestring32 xmss_reduced_n32_t72[72];

    case xmssmt-shake256_40/2_256:
    case xmssmt-shake256_60/3_256:
      bytestring32 xmss_reduced_n32_t87[87];
  };

  /* xmss_reduced_array depends on d */

  union xmss_reduced_array (xmss_algorithm_type type) {
    case xmssmt-sha2_20/2_192:
    case xmssmt-sha2_40/2_192:
    case xmssmt-shake256_20/2_256:
    case xmssmt-shake256_40/2_256:
    case xmssmt-shake256_20/2_192:
    case xmssmt-shake256_40/2_192:
      xmss_reduced xmss_red_arr_d2[2];

    case xmssmt-sha2_60/3_192:
    case xmssmt-shake256_60/3_256:
    case xmssmt-shake256_60/3_192:
      xmss_reduced xmss_red_arr_d3[3];

    case xmssmt-sha2_20/4_192:
    case xmssmt-sha2_40/4_192:
    case xmssmt-shake256_20/4_256:
    case xmssmt-shake256_40/4_256:
    case xmssmt-shake256_20/4_192:
    case xmssmt-shake256_40/4_192:
      xmss_reduced xmss_red_arr_d4[4];

    case xmssmt-sha2_60/6_192:
    case xmssmt-shake256_60/6_256:
    case xmssmt-shake256_60/6_192:
      xmss_reduced xmss_red_arr_d6[6];

    case xmssmt-sha2_40/8_192:
    case xmssmt-shake256_40/8_256:
    case xmssmt-shake256_40/8_192:
      xmss_reduced xmss_red_arr_d8[8];

    case xmssmt-sha2_60/12_192:
    case xmssmt-shake256_60/12_256:
    case xmssmt-shake256_60/12_192:
```

```
        xmss_reduced xmss_red_arr_d12[12];
    };

    /* Types for bitmask seed */

    union seed switch (xmssmt_algorithm_type type) {
      case xmssmt-sha2_20/2_192:
      case xmssmt-sha2_20/4_192:
      case xmssmt-sha2_40/2_192:
      case xmssmt-sha2_40/4_192:
      case xmssmt-sha2_40/8_192:
      case xmssmt-sha2_60/3_192:
      case xmssmt-sha2_60/6_192:
      case xmssmt-sha2_60/12_192:
      case xmssmt-shake256_20/2_192:
      case xmssmt-shake256_20/4_192:
      case xmssmt-shake256_40/2_192:
      case xmssmt-shake256_40/4_192:
      case xmssmt-shake256_40/8_192:
      case xmssmt-shake256_60/3_192:
      case xmssmt-shake256_60/6_192:
      case xmssmt-shake256_60/12_192:
        bytestring24 seed_n24;

      case xmssmt-shake256_20/2_256:
      case xmssmt-shake256_20/4_256:
      case xmssmt-shake256_40/2_256:
      case xmssmt-shake256_40/4_256:
      case xmssmt-shake256_40/8_256:
      case xmssmt-shake256_60/3_256:
      case xmssmt-shake256_60/6_256:
      case xmssmt-shake256_60/12_256:
        bytestring32 seed_n32;

    };

    /* Types for XMSS^MT root node */

    union xmssmt_root switch (xmssmt_algorithm_type type) {
      case xmssmt-sha2_20/2_192:
      case xmssmt-sha2_20/4_192:
      case xmssmt-sha2_40/2_192:
      case xmssmt-sha2_40/4_192:
      case xmssmt-sha2_40/8_192:
      case xmssmt-sha2_60/3_192:
      case xmssmt-sha2_60/6_192:
      case xmssmt-sha2_60/12_192:
```

```
      case xmssmt-shake256_20/2_192:
      case xmssmt-shake256_20/4_192:
      case xmssmt-shake256_40/2_192:
      case xmssmt-shake256_40/4_192:
      case xmssmt-shake256_40/8_192:
      case xmssmt-shake256_60/3_192:
      case xmssmt-shake256_60/6_192:
      case xmssmt-shake256_60/12_192:
        bytestring24 root_n24;

      case xmssmt-shake256_20/2_256:
      case xmssmt-shake256_20/4_256:
      case xmssmt-shake256_40/2_256:
      case xmssmt-shake256_40/4_256:
      case xmssmt-shake256_40/8_256:
      case xmssmt-shake256_60/3_256:
      case xmssmt-shake256_60/6_256:
      case xmssmt-shake256_60/12_256:
        bytestring32 root_n32;
    };
```

# Appendix C—Provable Security Analysis

This appendix briefly summarizes the formal security model and proofs of security of the LMS and XMSS signature schemes and provides a short discussion comparing these models and proofs.

## C.1 The Random Oracle Model

In the *random oracle model* (ROM), there is a publicly accessible random oracle that both the user and the adversary can send queries to and receive responses from at any time. A random oracle *H* is a hypothetical, *interactive* black-box algorithm that obeys the following rules:

1. Every time the algorithm *H* receives a new input string *s*, it generates an output *t* uniformly at random from its output space and returns the response *t*. The algorithm *H* then records the pair (*s*, *t*) for future use.
2. If the algorithm *H* is ever queried in the future with some prior input *s*, it will always return the same output *t* according to its recorded memory.

Alternatively, the random oracle *H* can be described as a non-interactive but *exponentially large* look-up table initialized with truly random outputs *t* for each possible input string *s*.

To say that a cryptographic security proof is done in the random oracle model means that every use of a particular function (for example, in the case here, the compression function that is used to perform hashes) is replaced by a query to the random oracle *H*. This simplifies security claims as, for example, it becomes easy to prove upper bounds on the likelihood of producing a second preimage within a fixed number of queries to *H*. On the other hand, (compression) functions in the real world are neither interactive nor have exponentially large descriptions, so they cannot truly behave like a random oracle.

It is therefore desirable to have a cryptographic security proof that avoids using the random oracle model. However, this often leads to less efficient cryptographic systems, or it is not yet known how to perform a proof without appealing to the random oracle model, or both. So, as a matter of real-world pragmatism, the ROM is commonly used.

## C.2 The Quantum Random Oracle Model

The *quantum random oracle model* (QROM) is similar to the ROM, except it is additionally assumed that all parties (in particular, the adversary) have quantum computers and can query the random oracle *H* in superposition. (In the real world, the random oracle *H* is still instantiated as a compression function or similar, as per the cryptosystem's specification.) While this complicates security claims as compared to the ROM, it more accurately models the power of an adversary that has access to a large-scale quantum device for its cryptanalysis when attacking a real-world scheme.

## C.3 LMS Security Proof

In [11], the author considers a particular experiment in the random oracle model in which the adversary is given a series of strings with prefixes (in a randomly chosen but structured manner) and hash targets. The attacker's goal is to find one more string that has the same prefix and hash target as any of its input strings. The author proves an upper bound on the adversary's ability to compute first or second preimages from these strings (by querying the compression function modeled as a random oracle).

Then, the author reduces the problem of forging a signature in LMS to this stated experiment, concluding that the same upper bounds apply to the problem of producing forgeries against LMS. This random oracle model proof critically depends on the randomness of the prefixes used in LMS, which means that LMS in the real world critically depends on the pseudorandomness of the prefixes.

Further, in [15], the same proof is carried out in the QROM.

### C.4 XMSS Security Proof

In [12], a security analysis for the *original* (academic publication) version of XMSS is given under the following assumptions:

1. The function family $\{f_k\}$ used to construct Winternitz signatures is pseudorandom. This means that if the bit string $k$ is chosen uniformly at random, then an adversary given black-box access to the function $f_k$ cannot distinguish this black box from a random function within a polynomial number of queries (except with negligible probability).
2. The hash function family $\{h_k\}$ is second preimage-resistant. This means that if bit strings $k$ and $m$ are chosen uniformly at random, then an adversary given $k$ and $m$ cannot construct $m' \neq m$ such that $h_k(m') = h_k(m)$ in polynomial time (except with negligible probability).

The proof in [12] asserts that if both of these assumptions are true, then XMSS is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA) in the standard model.

However, in the *current* version of XMSS$^{MT}$ [1], the security analysis differs somewhat. In the standard model, [17] shows that XMSS$^{MT}$ is EUF-CMA. Further, [16] shows that XMSS$^{MT}$ is post-quantum existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attacks with respect to the QROM.

In a little more detail, the current version of XMSS uses two types of assumptions:

1. A standard model assumption – that the hash function $h_k$, used for the one-time signatures and tree node computations, is post-quantum, multi-function, multi-target decisional second-preimage-resistant.
2. A (quantum) random oracle model assumption – that the pseudorandom function $f_k$, used to generate pseudorandom values for randomized hashing and computing bitmasks as blinding keys, may be validly modeled as a quantum random oracle $H$.

### C.5 Comparison of the Security Models and Proofs of LMS and XMSS

Generally speaking, both LMS and XMSS are supported by sound security proofs under commonly used cryptographic hardness assumptions. That is, if these cryptographic assumptions are true, then both schemes are provably shown to be existentially unforgeable under chosen message attack, even against an adversary that has access to a large-scale quantum computer for use in its forgery attack.

The main difference between these schemes' security analyses comes down to the use (and the degree of use) of the random oracle or quantum random oracle models. Along these lines, the difference between the (standard model/real world) cryptographic assumption that some function family $\{f_k\}$ is pseudorandom and the use of the random oracle model is briefly pointed out. For a function $f_k$ to be a pseudorandom function in the real world, it should be the case that the bit string $k$ used as the key to the function remains private, meaning that it is not in the view of the adversary at any point of the security experiment. On the other hand, a random oracle $H$ achieves the same pseudorandomness (or even randomness) properties of a pseudorandom function $f_k$, but there is no key $k$ necessarily associated with the random oracle. Indeed, all inputs to the random oracle $H$ may be known to all parties and, in particular, to the adversary. Therefore, using the random oracle model clearly involves making a stronger assumption about the (limits of the) cryptanalytic power of the adversary.

That said, a security proof is either *entirely* a "real world proof," which does not use the random oracle model, or it appeals to the random oracle methodology in some manner. The security analysis of the current version of XMSS only uses the random oracle $H$ when performing randomized hashing and computing bitmasks, whereas LMS uses the random oracle $H$ to a greater degree (modeling the compression function as a random oracle). However, it remains the case that both schemes in their modern form are ultimately proven secure using the ROM and QROM.

Therefore, the cryptographic hardness assumptions made by LMS and XMSS in order to achieve existential unforgeability under chosen message attack (EUF-CMA) may be viewed as substantially similar and worthy of essentially equal confidence. As such, the practitioner's decision to deploy one scheme or the other should primarily depend on other factors, such as the efficiency demands for a given deployment environment or the other security considerations enumerated earlier in this document.